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Abstract—We consider a simple classification of input flaws in
two categories: (1) flaws in processing input, with buffer overflows
in parsers as the classic example and (2) flaws in forwarding input
to some other system, aka injection flaws, with SQL injection
and XSS as classic examples. The LangSec paradigm identifies
common root causes for both categories of flaws, but much of
the LangSec literature and efforts focus on the first category of
flaws, esp. on techniques to eliminate parser bugs. Therefore we
take a look at some existing approaches to tackling the second
category of flaws, to identify (anti)patterns and place these in the
LangSec perspective.
I. INTRODUCTION
LangSec gives excellent insights in the security problems in
input handling that plague our software: into the root causes
behind these problems, anti-patterns that are likely to result in
security flaws, and patterns that can help to prevent them.
Broadly speaking, two categories of input problems can
be distinguished: processing flaws and forwarding flaws (aka
injection attacks). Some of same root causes are at play but
some of ways forward to tackle these two categories of flaws
are different. Much of the LangSec literature and efforts focus
on the first category, with the aim to root out parser bugs and
parser differentials.
To redress the balance, this paper considers the second
category and looks at ideas and (anti)patterns in tackling
injection flaws. One approach here is to address the problem at
the level of the programming language, as proposed in Wyvern
[1], with a so-called type-specific programming language that
offers native support for input and output formats handled
by programs. Another approach is the ongoing evolution in
mechanisms to tackle XSS in applications [2]. For the sake of
completeness, but at the risk of boring some readers, we also
include infamous anti-patterns such as PHP magicquotes
and dynamic SQL queries built using string concatenation.
The underlying (anti)patterns we observe also come up in
software security design guidelines [3] and fit very naturally
in the LangSec paradigm, as they confirm once again the
central role of input languages and the associated parsing in
input security flaws. Moreover, the simple classification we
use and the (anti)patterns we observe suggest an extension
(or refinement?) of the taxonomy of LangSec errors proposed
by Momot et al. [4] and additions to the list of remedies to
expunge them.
II. PROCESSING VS FORWARDING FLAWS
In a typical attack on an application, the attacker crafts some
malicious input that causes the software to go off the rails, with
all sorts of nasty consequences. When faced with a creative
attacker
‘Garbage In, Garbage Out’
quickly descends into
‘Malicious Garbage In, Security Incident Out’.
We can distinguish two kinds of flaws in input handling:
Buggy processing. As LangSec points out, many input
problems arise due to buggy parsing of input. Classic examples
here are buffer overflows in parsers for complex input formats
such as Flash or PDF. The program containing this buggy
parser then provides some weird behaviour – a weird machine,
in LangSec terminology [5] – when fed malformed input (or
sometimes even when fed correctly formed input), and the
attacker tries to (ab)use this weird functionality in interesting
ways.
Buffer overflows and other memory-related bugs make
up for the a large share of these attacks, but any kind of
logical flaw in the parsing or subsequent processing of input,
may provide weird functionality for an attacker to exploit.
Differences between parsers for the same language, so-called
parser differentials [6], can also provide wriggling room for
an attacker.
Note that the weird functionality that the attacker abuses
here has typically been introduced by accident in the code.
Careless forwarding. In other input attacks, the problem is
not so much buggy processing of input, but rather careless
forwarding of input to some external system or back-end
service or API, so that malicious input can propagate to do
damage there. Classic examples are SQL injection, command
injection, path traversal, and XSS (Cross Site Scripting). These
flaws are also known as injection flaws1. We prefer the term
forwarding flaws because in some sense all input attacks are
injection attacks; the forwarding aspect is what sets these input
attacks apart from the others.
The external system or service that is abused could be a
separate application, some OS service, or an internal API for
1The definition of injection flaws used in the OWASP Top 10 2017 [7],
where injection flaws occupy the number 1 spot, and have done for many
years, excludes XSS. The importance of scripting on the web, and hence the
extra difficulties in rooting out XSS compared to say SQL injection, justify
XSS getting its own spot in the OWASP Top 10, but it is fundamentally just
another injection flaw like the others.
a component inside the application, but that does not make
any difference for most of the discussion in this paper.
Forwarding attacks do not rely on any parser bugs: the back-
end service, say the SQL database, parses and processes its
inputs correctly. Of course, there could also be parser bugs
in this service for an attacker to abuse, but we ignore that
possibility not to confuse the discussion. So the problem is not
that this functionality is buggy, but rather that it is exposed to
attacker, without proper constraints. Consequently, the weird
machine that the attacker can abuse with forwarding attacks
is often not quite so weird, as it provides normal functionality
of say a SQL database or the underlying OS. The attacker
abuses functionality has been introduced deliberately, but that
is exposed accidentally.
An interesting class of flaws to compare the two categories
are attacks with Microsoft Office documents that contain ma-
licious macros. This is a (deservedly!) popular form of attack
and frequently used in phishing campaigns2. It is different
from many other input attacks in that it requires a human
user to click on some attachment, which is probably why is
it is (undeservedly!) missing in many lists of standard input
attacks. However, it is just another forwarding attacks: a Word
document with a PowerShell macro is just another way of
doing OS command injection.
Attackers can also exploit parser flaws in phishing attacks,
e.g. using malicious PDF attachments that exploit some buffer
overflow in the parser of a PDF viewer. But that has the
disadvantage of depending on a specific flaw in a specific
PDF viewer and it is typically harder to craft payloads to
exploit buffer overflows than to write macros: so exploiting
a feature of Microsoft Office can be much more attractive
than exploiting a bug in a PDF viewer.
III. COMMON ROOT CAUSES
Some of the same root causes highlighted by LangSec are
at play in both parsing and forwarding attacks. One root
cause is the expressivity of input languages used by back-end
services. E.g. one can question the wisdom in having such
a powerful feature as macros in a document input format,
and indeed LangSec warns us about the expressive power of
input languages. A second root cause is the sheer number of
such languages, which may include SQL, OS commands, path
names, LDAP, XML, . . . .
IV. COMMON ANTI-PATTERN: SHOTGUN PARSING
The well-known LangSec anti-pattern of shotgun parsing
is present in forwarding flaws, as noted in [4]: some of the
parsing is not done in the main application but in the external
service it relies on. However, it is not so clear that this anti-
pattern is really avoidable here: after all, the back-end service
is meant to process some data, and doing some parsing for
that may be unavoidable.
2This has led to countermeasures, such as opening untrusted documents in
a protected mode with macros disabled, aka ‘Protected View’, but a bit more
social engineering can typically easily overcome that.
V. INPUT OR OUTPUT PROBLEM?
A fundamental complication with forwarding flaws is that
they involve two systems – the front-end application and a
back-end service – and that they involve both input and output,
as the input language of the back-end is the output language
of the front-end. This raises the question of who is to blame,
and who can or should prevent the problem: is the application
at fault for being careless in invoking the back-end service,
or the back-end service at fault for expressing a too powerful
interface? It also introduces a well-known dilemma in where
and how do to do validation of user input, esp. when it comes
to sanitisation, discussed in more detail below.
VI. ANTI-PATTERN: INPUT SANITISATION
There are different kinds of operations that can be done as
part of input validation. A validation routine can simply filter
out the invalid inputs from valid ones, rejecting the invalid
ones, but it can also try to sanitise data, also called encoding
or escaping. The typical example is escaping dangerous char-
acters that have a special meaning in the back-end, to prevent
forwarding flaws3.
To explicitly distinguish these two aspects, the first can be
called filtering and the second sanitisation, but beware that the
terms input validation and input sanitisation are often treated
as synonyms4.
A complication with forwarding flaws is that ideally one
would like validate input at the point where the input enters
the application, because at that program point it is clear that
it is untrusted input. However, at that point you may not yet
know in which context the input will be used, and different
contexts will may require different forms of escaping. E.g. the
same input string could be used in a path name, a URL, an
SQL query, and a piece of HTML text, and these contexts may
need different encodings.
Because escaping is context-sensitive, it is well known that
using one generic operation to sanitise all input is highly
suspect, as one generic operation is never going to provide
the right escaping for a variety of different back-end systems.
Moreover, doing input sanitisation, i.e. sanitisation at the point
of input rather than at the point of output, is suspect, as the
context typically is not known there.
The classic example here is the PHP magicquotes
setting, which caused all incoming data to be automatically
escaped (by pre-pending certain characters with a backslash).
It took a while for people to come to the agreement that this
was a bad idea: magicquotes were depreciated in PHP 5.3
and finally removed in PHP 5.4 in 20125.
3Typically this escaping uses a black-list approach rather than a white-list
approach; this is known to be more dangerous, but we’ll ignore that in this
paper
4Canonicalisation is a third aspect of validation, and an important one, but
we ignore it here, as it is not relevant to our discussion.
5http://php.net/manual/en/security.magicquotes.php
VII. ANTI-PATTERN: STRING CONCATENATION FOR
DYNAMIC QUERIES
Another well-known anti-pattern in forwarding attacks is the
use of string concatenation to combine user input with other
strings to construct a parameter that is fed to some API call,
as is done in dynamic SQL queries.
Given that LangSec highlights the importance of parsing,
it is interesting to note that string concatenation is a form of
unparsing. Indeed, the whole problem with forwarding attacks
is that the back-end service may parse query strings in a
different way that intended.
An early effort investigating the essence of injection attacks
proposed a runtime countermeasure which traces user input
as it propagates through an application to then detects if it
corrupts the way queries are parsed [8]. Here a query is
deemed to be corrupted if the shape of the resulting parse
tree has changed. This uses a negative security model: it aims
to identify and stopping unsafe cases.
Of course, the better way to prevent SQL injection is to use
parameterised queries6. This uses a positive security model: it
tries to prevent unsafe SQL calls, and at compile time, rather
than weeding them out at runtime.
The use of parameterised queries reduces the expressive
power of the interface to the back-end database and reduces
the amount of runtime parsing. So clearly this mechanism
involves key aspects highlighted in the LangSec paradigm,
namely expressivity and parsing.
VIII. PATTERN: PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE SUPPORT FOR
INPUT/OUTPUT LANGUAGES
Even if programmers are aware that the benefits of prepared
statements, they might still use dynamic SQL queries because
of the convenience. The programming language Wyvern7
[9], [10], dubbed a type-specific language, proposed a more
structural way to rule out forwarding problems, by natively
embedding different (input or output) languages inside the
programming language. The aim here is to provide a safe
mechanism where the program always handles structured data
rather than strings, but a way that is just as convenient for
the programmer as using strings. Having a native embedding
helps here by allowing notations that are just as convenient for
the programmer as for strings. The idea is that type-specific
programming language does not provide ad-hoc support for
one output language like SQL, but allows any number of
languages to be embedded. In the original use case, web
programming, these embedded languages would include both
SQL and HTML. These different languages then show up as
different types in the programming languages.
IX. PATTERN: SECURITY TYPES FOR OUTPUT
SANITISATION
Even if automatic input sanitisation built into the pro-
gramming language construct with a global setting like
6or stored procedures, though these are not always safe, as discussed on
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet
7https://github.com/wyvernlang/wyvern
magicquotes cannot work, in some circumstances auto-
mated output sanitisation can be made to work. A fundamental
problem with sanitising outgoing data is that at that program
point where data is passed on as output, it is typically not
clear if this data stems from user input, but type systems can
be used to remedy this.
An example where this approach has been successfully
used is in web templating frameworks, where mechanisms
have been added to existing frameworks to automatically
perform sanitisation in a context-sensitive manner [11]. The
approach uses type qualifiers [12], which for instance distin-
guish string constants from unsanitised input variables, so that
type inference traces which sanatisations have been performed
and, given a specific context in which a variable is used,
decide which additional sanatisations need to be inserted.
The approach was demonstrated to be practicable with an
implementation for Google’s Closure Templates.
This approach has since evolved to a wider systematic
approach to combat XSS at Google [2]. In addition to the
automatic sanitisation in template engines, the approach relies
on safe APIs that acts as a wrapper around original API
that suffers from injection problems. Security types play a
central role in the approach. For example, it relies on a type
SafeHtml for strings (or string-like objects) that will not
cause untrusted script execution when evaluated as HTML in
a browser, and which are therefore safe to use as HTML or as
HTML parameter in calls to the DOM APIs. Only a limited set
of constructions can be used to construct elements of this type,
which guarantee the soundness of the assumptions captured by
the type.
The ongoing struggle against XSS attacks is by no means
finished. The latest forms of DOM-based XSS attacks using
script gadgets [13] highlight the fundamental difficulties in
rooting out XSS via the DOM. A recent proposal ‘Trusted
Types for DOM Manipulation’8 aims to replace all string-
based APIs of the DOM with typed APIs, in an effort to get
rid of DOM-based XSS
X. ANTI-PATTERN: STRINGS CONSIDERED HARMFUL
One recurring anti-pattern – the elephant in the room – is
the use of strings. There are several reasons why the use of
strings can lead to problems, and heavy use of strings is a sign
of trouble:
• Strings can be used for all sorts of data: email ad-
dresses, file names, URLs, fragments of HTML, pieces of
JavaScript, etc. This makes it a very useful and ubiquitous
data type, but it the downside is that using the same type
for different kind of data can cause confusion: from the
type we cannot tell what the intended use of the data is,
or indeed whether it has been validated.
• Strings are by definition unparsed data. So if a program
uses strings, it will typically have to do parsing at
runtime, incl. parsing that could have been avoided if
8http://github.com/WICG/trusted-types. Also presented at OWASP Benelux
2017 [14].
more structured forms of data were used instead. The
extra parsing creates a lot of room for trouble, esp. in
combination with the point above, which means that the
same string might end up in different parsers.
• String parameters in interfaces often bring unwanted
expressivity. Interfaces that take strings as parameter
often – implicitly or explicitly – introduce a whole new
language, with all sorts of expressive power that may not
be necessary, and which only provides a security risk.
In summary, the problem with strings is that they use one
generic data type, for completely unstructured data, and for
many kinds of data, hiding the fact that there are many
different languages involved, possibly very expressive ones,
each with their own interpretation.
(For these disadvantages it does not matter if the strings
we use are type-safe, memory-safe and immutable String
objects in a language such as Java; string objects in C++,
without these nice guarantees; or C byte arrays or char*
pointers, which are even more error-prone. Of course, the more
safety guarantees we can get from our programming language,
and the less error-prone the data type or its, the better.)
XI. CONCLUSION
The distinction between processing flaws and forwarding
flaws is a very natural and obvious one when considering
security problems in input handling, but we have not aware
of this distinction having been discussed from a LangSec
perspective. The LangSec view is useful for both categories
of flaws: input languages play a central role in both; there
are common root causes, namely the large number of input
languages and the expressivity of these languages; and shotgun
parsers appear as anti-pattern for both, even if for forwarding
flaws this anti-pattern is harder to avoid.
Many of the ways forward suggested by the LangSec
paradigm focus on eradicating parser bugs (e.g. insisting on
clear specifications of input languages, keeping these lan-
guages simple, generating parsers from formal specs instead
of hand-rolling written parser code, and separating parsing
and subsequent processing in an attempt to avoid shotgun
parsers). However, these techniques are not sufficient to root
out forwarding flaws. Even if we can get rid of all parser bugs
we can still have forwarding flaws, and some form of shotgun
parsing seems unavoidable with forwarding flaws.
Fortunately, there are ideas for ways forward, which already
appear in the literature and in practice. Important recommen-
dations here, which we feel deserve to be added to the list of
LangSec remedies listed in [4], are
• avoid using strings
• use types offered by the programming language, not only
to distinguish different input languages (e.g. distinguish-
ing HTML from SQL) but also to distinguish differ-
ent trust assumptions about the data (e.g. distinguishing
tainted user input from sanitised values or constants).
Some the (anti)patterns we discussed also show up in the
security design flaws discussed by Arce et al. [3], more in
particular under ‘Strictly separate data and control instructions,
and never process control instructions received from untrusted
sources’ and ‘Define an approach that ensures all data are
explicitly validated’, Both Wyvern and Google approach to
combatting XSS can be seen as ways to put these design prin-
ciples in practices, at the level of the programming language,
or at least its type system. Note that these approaches belong
to the paradigm of language-based security as much as to
the paradigm of language-theoretic security. (Beware of the
possible confusion here: in the term language-based security,
the word ‘language’ refers to programming languages, whereas
in the term language-theoretic security, it refers to input
languages.)
The (anti)-patterns for injection flaws that we observe are
related to familiar LangSec themes of parsing and the ex-
pressive power of input languages: the remedies try to reduce
expressive power, try to reduce the potential for confusion and
mistakes in (un)parsing, or try to avoid (un)parsing altogether.
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